## **Aerosol Triggers**

#### Thomas H. Jeys

#### **New England Bioterrorism Preparedness Workshop**

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MS-15436


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#### **Biosensor Architecture**



- Trigger (< 60 s)
  - Continuous operation
  - Alert of potential threat aerosol
- Collector (5 min)
  - Activated by trigger
  - Provide sample of aerosol particles

- Identification (15 min)
  - Preliminary identification of agent
- Confirmation (4 24 hr)
  - Final identification of agent
  - "Gold Standard" tests
  - Performed in laboratory (TAML)



## **Bio-Aerosol Triggers**

- Raw Particle Counters
  - Small, low cost
  - Nondiscriminatory very high false trigger rates
- Fluorescent Particle Counters
  - Ultra Violet Aerodynamic Particle Sizer (UVAPS)

Trigger for Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)

Manufactured by TSI Inc. (St. Paul, MN)

Fluorescence Aerodynamic Particle Sizer (FLAPS)

Different trigger algorithm than UVAPS

Trigger for Canadian Integrated Biological Agent Detection System (CIBADS)

Biological Agent Detection Sensor (BAWS)

Trigger for Joint Biological Point Detection System Manufactured by Intellitec (Deland, FL)



## **Biological Agent Warning Sensor (BAWS)**

- Army Advanced Technology Demonstration
  - Began BAWS development in 1996
- Four design generations developed
- Extensively tested
  - Performance
  - Environmental
- Integrated into the Joint Biological Point Detection System
  - Development transitioned to JBPDS in 1999.


#### **BAWS III**





Size 0.8 ft<sup>3</sup> Weight 19 lbs Power 35 W



### **BAWS Concept**









## **Joint Biological Point Detection System**




- Automated suite of sensors for detection and identification of biological attacks
  - Trigger BAWS
  - Collector Wetted Wall Cyclone
  - Identifier Immunoassay
  - Confirmatory Samples



**BAWS** 



## The Atmospheric Aerosol Composition




\*After R. Jaenicke in <u>Aerosol-Cloud-Climate Interactions</u>, P. Hobbs editor (1993).

Composition of Coarse (>1 micron) Aerosol

| Organic Aerosols      | Particles per Liter |              | Inorganic Aerosols          |
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|
| Man Made              | 0 – 2000            |              |                             |
| Fungi                 | 0 – 100             | 100 – 10,000 | Clays, Sands,<br>Composites |
| Bacteria (culturable) | 0 – 1               |              | Composites                  |
| Pollen                | 0 – 1               |              |                             |

#### **Total vs. Fluorescent Particles**





Most sand particles do not fluoresce and are "invisible" to BAWS



#### **Field Trials**











# Response of BAWS Array to Agent Aerosol






# Response of BAWS to Interferent and Agent Aerosol





### **Live Agent Tests of BAWS**

- Comparison of BAWS response to real agents and simulant agents
  - Simulant Agents; BG, Erwinia herbicola, Ovalbumin, MS2
  - Three Real agents



- Results: BAWS detects live agents as well as, or better than, simulant agents
  - Equivalent sensitivity
  - Equivalent discrimination



### **BAWS Performance Testing**

Joint Field Trials

JFT 3, DugwayJFT 4, DugwayFall '97

JFT 4.5, DugwaySpring '98

JFT 6, DRES Canada
 Fall '00

Army ATD Field Trials
 Spring '99

Joint Biological Point Detection System Field Trials

Mini Field Trials
 Fall '99

Gamma-Killed Bio-AgentsPPQTSpring '99Spring '00

Live AgentsSummer '00

Porton Down, UKFall '00

Ambient Breeze Tunnel, Battelle Spring '01

Operational Assessment 2
 Fall '01

Background Measurements

– USA tour '98 – '99

KuwaitSpring '99


Altitude studyFall '00

Salt Lake City
 Spring '01

HawaiiSummer '01




# Simulation of BAWS Response to Agent Attacks in Different Environments





## **Detector Position vs. False Trigger Rate**

- England (Sep '00)
  - One week of measurements
  - 21 agent simulant challenges
  - 8 interferent challenges
- Sensor Performance vs. sensor height
  - BAWS at 2-m and 13-m height
  - Ten times fewer false triggers at 13-m height





## **Summary**

- BAWS developed for early warning of a biological agent attack
  - continuously operating point detector
  - small size, low weight, low power consumption
- Generic detection (not identification) of threat aerosol
  - Individual detection of aerosol particles
  - Discrimination of threat particles from non-threat particles
  - Sensitive, low false alarm rate, fast response
- Subjected to extensive testing
  - Performance
  - environmental
- BAWS integrated into JBPDS